It has been widely recognized that one major historical failure of the Albanians is that they created their state belatedly, and since its creation, the Albanian state has suffered from authoritarianism and poor functionality. Some even assert that it has never been a western democracy. Skepticism over the feasibility and success of the administrative and judicial reforms, with their goal of resolving current problems of the Albanian citizens and transforming the society to make it more democratic and more economically successful, is embedded in a realistic appraisal of the shortcomings of our recent and distant history. Thus, even if we assume the full prestige and power of the current government to proceed with the course of pro-western reforms, we should be cautious, because the success of the reforms does not depend entirely on the government, but it relates to the entire Albanian society and political landscape.
The Albanian people now have the right to amend the constitutional and legal framework designed by the political elite, but the outcome seems to remain the same. Hence, it would be unfair to blame only on the political class. Most of the Albanian society has remained submissive to phenomena that have plagued our post-communist life. At this crucial moment, when the E.U. and U.S. have breathed new air into people's aspirations to build up a modern state, the perception of the past experiences is a pattern which makes the success of the justice reform a major challenge to undertake. Thus far, by the approval of the constitutional and legal amendments, we have only seen the tip of the iceberg. The reforms are to be implemented in an extremely dense and complex socio-political context of shared and conflicting material interests. The socio-political class driven by the material and financial gains will be unsuccessful in the reform implementation. In fact, a radical and immediate approach to the ordinary problems facing the judiciary and the administration would be hard to imagine. Bringing up the example of the vetting process of the magistrates, it is obvious that the incumbent government is using the strategy “go as far as possible”. It must be noted that the people who were appointed to re-evaluate the institutions were selected in a climate of “mutual political love”. The experts were either public office appointees, key politicians or anonymous lawyers with a dubious credibility completely undermining the genuine nature of vetting process. By sabotaging the Judicial Reform, the vetting institutions, the people, the political class manifests a latent will that it is not loyal to the reforms and to the social change that they are expected to produce. With all the matters and obstacles of the judicial reform, if we are going to define what we would agree to be the “success of the judicial reforms”; rely on the implicit ideas about how law relates to our social, economic and political life, it might be appropriate to ask the same question as the constitutionalist Tom Ginsburg asks: ” How does a system based on personal social relations and close ties between business and government move toward a more open and transparent system governed by generally applicable rules? What configuration of political interests are required to initiate and sustain such a transformation?”